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FOSTER V. CHATMAN: CLARIFYING
THE BATSON TEST FOR
DISCRIMINATORY PEREMPTORY
STRIKES
MEGHAN DALY*
INTRODUCTION
Peremptory challenges have existed since the early days of the
1
common law. Many believe that peremptory challenges help
2
prosecutors ensure fair and impartial juries. Prosecutors often,
however, use peremptory strikes for discriminatory purposes. The
3
Supreme Court introduced a test in Batson v. Kentucky to evaluate
whether peremptory strikes used on potential jurors were based on
racial discrimination. Implementing the ambiguous Batson test has
proven extremely difficult. Social scientists have found that
prosecutors still commonly use race as a factor in selecting juries, and
black jurors remain underrepresented relative to their proportion of
4
the population in many jurisdictions, which suggests the Batson test
has failed to effectuate its purpose.
5
The question presented in Foster v. Chatman is whether the state
habeas court erred when it held that the prosecution’s use of
peremptory strikes was not a violation of the Batson test. According

* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2017 .
1. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 639 (1991) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (describing the common law heritage of peremptory challenges).
2. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218–19 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986).
3. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
4. See, e.g., Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, A Stubborn Legacy: The
Overwhelming Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson North Carolina Capital
Trials, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1531, 1533 (2012) (finding Batson is under-enforced in North Carolina);
David C. Baldus, et. al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal
and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 10 (2001) (finding both prosecutors and
defense attorneys commonly use racially-motivated peremptory strikes in Philadelphia capital
murder cases).
5. NO. 14-8349 (U.S. Nov. 2, 2015).
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to the habeas court, new evidence uncovered by Foster failed to show
that the trial court committed clear error when the trial court
accepted the race-neutral reasons the prosecution offered for striking
all potential black jurors from Foster’s trial jury. Cases like Foster’s
are far from unique. While the Court has found Batson violations in
several instances, state trial and appellate courts rarely rule in favor of
6
a Batson challenge.
This Commentary argues the Court in Foster v. Chatman should
rule that prosecutorial strikes constitute race discrimination
prohibited by Batson. The prosecutorial notes presented by Foster
show strong evidence of discrimination against black potential jurors,
7
circumstances closely similar to those in Miller-El v. Dretke, in which
the Court accepted a Batson challenge. Ruling in favor of the State
would prevent Batson relief in the very situation the test was designed
to remedy. Additionally, such a ruling would prevent the Court from
refining the Batson test in order to halt courts from automatically
accepting any race-neutral explanation presented by prosecutors.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 27, 1986, Petitioner Timothy Foster broke into the
8
home of 79-year-old Queen Madge White. He broke her jaw with a
9
fireplace log and sexually molested her with a salad dressing bottle.
Finally, Foster strangled White to death and took several items from
10
White’s home before he left. The next morning, White’s sister found
the body, which was covered in a blanket to her neck and coated with
11
12
talcum powder. A month later, Foster was arrested. While searching
13
Foster’s home, police recovered several of White’s possessions.
During an interrogation following his arrest, Foster confessed to
14
White’s murder.

6. Equal Justice Initiative, Illegal Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: A Continuing
Legacy at 13–27 (Aug. 2010), http://www.eji.org/files/EJI%20Race%20and%20Jury%
20Report.pdf.
7. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005).
8. Brief of Respondent at 3, Foster v. Chatman, No. 14-8349 (U.S. Sept. 8, 2015)
[hereinafter Brief of Respondent].
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Foster v. State, 374 S.E.2d, 188, 190 (Ga. 1988).
12. Id. at 736 n.1.
13. Id. at 736.
14. Id.
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Four months prior to the start of jury selection for Foster’s trial,
the defense sought to prevent the prosecution from using peremptory
challenges to exclude black prospective jurors and to require the
prosecution to provide an explanation for any decision to strike a
15
black prospective juror.
The pool of jurors for Foster’s trial
16
consisted of ninety-five prospective jurors, ten of whom were black.
Each prospective juror filled out a questionnaire and underwent
17
individual voir dire, and after that process, forty-two prospective
18
jurors remained. The prosecution used four of its ten peremptory
strikes to remove the four qualified black prospective jurors. The
19
result was an all-white jury. The prosecution had highlighted all of
the black prospective jurors in green, and identified the black jurors
20
with a “B.” Furthermore, the qualified black prospective jurors were
listed first in the prosecution’s “Definite NO” column—meaning that
21
they were at the very top of the list to be excluded. Nevertheless, the
prosecution claimed that race was not a factor in striking the black
prospective jurors, and provided a list of eight to twelve race-neutral
22
reasons for each strike.
The jury convicted Foster of malice murder and burglary and
23
sentenced him to death. Foster issued an appeal to the Georgia
Supreme Court, which affirmed his conviction, finding that the strikes
24
were “sufficiently neutral and legitimate.” Foster filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus with the Superior Court of Butts County,
Georgia in 1989, claiming that he had an intellectual disability that
25
rendered him ineligible for the death penalty under Georgia law. In
1999, the Superior Court of Floyd County, Georgia held a trial to
26
assess Foster’s intellectual state. The jury determined that Foster did
not meet the standard for exclusion, and the habeas case resumed in
27
Butts County. In 2006, Foster’s counsel obtained the prosecution’s
15. Brief of Respondent, supra note 8, at 4–5.
16. Brief of Petitioner at 4–5, Foster v. Chatman, No. 14-8349 (U.S. July 24, 2015)
[hereinafter Brief of Petitioner].
17. Id. at 5.
18. Id.
19. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 16, at 2.
20. Id. at 3.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 2–3.
23. Id. at 736.
24. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 15, at 12–13 (citation omitted).
25. Id. at 13.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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28

jury selection notes from Foster’s 1987 trial. It was then that Foster
discovered that the prospective black jurors had been earmarked by
29
race. However, the Superior Court of Butts County, which acted as
Foster’s habeas court, denied relief in 2013. The habeas court found
that Foster’s Batson claim lacked merit because he failed to show
30
discrimination. Foster issued an application for a certificate of
probable cause to appeal with the Georgia Supreme Court, which was
31
denied on November 3, 2014. The United States Supreme Court
32
granted certiorari on May 26, 2015 to review Foster’s racial
33
discrimination claim under the Batson test.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that, while
prosecutors are entitled to peremptory challenges, “the Equal
Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors
solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors
as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State’s case
34
against a black defendant.” In his opinion, Justice Powell illustrated
that the Court has long protected defendants from prosecutors
purposefully removing members of the defendant’s race from the jury
35
pool. According to the court, “[p]urposeful racial discrimination in
the selection of the venire violates a defendant’s right to equal
protection because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is
36
intended to secure.” While prosecutors are generally allowed to use
peremptory strikes for any reason, the Court in Batson recognized
that the Equal Protection Clause places “some limits on the State’s
37
exercise of peremptory challenges.”

28. Id. at 14.
29. See id. at 14–19 (describing the notes Foster received from the prosecution).
30. Brief of Respondent, supra note 8, at 10.
31. Id.
32. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 16, at 1.
33. Id. at i.
34. Id. at 80.
35. Id. at 84–85. See also Strauder v. Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 304 (1879), abrogated by
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (holding that excluding black jurors violated a black
defendant’s rights); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79 (1986) (stating that denying blacks participation on juries was a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause).
36. Batson, 476 U.S. at 86.
37. Id. at 91.
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In Batson and its progeny, the Supreme Court has laid out a threestep process to establish that prosecutors unlawfully discriminated in
38
issuing their peremptory strikes. First, the defendant must make out
a prima facie case of racial discrimination involving peremptory
39
strikes. Second, the prosecution will present a race-neutral
40
explanation for its actions. Third, the trial court will consider the
evidence presented and decide whether it finds evidence proving
41
intentional racial discrimination.
In the first step of a Batson challenge, the defendant needs to
demonstrate membership in a certain racial group and establish that
the prosecutor used peremptory strikes to remove prospective jurors
42
belonging to that racial group. Additionally, the defendant must
present facts from which the court could infer the prosecutor
43
discriminated to exclude prospective jurors on account of their race.
The second step of a Batson analysis begins once the defendant
44
shows racial discrimination. It is then up to the prosecution to come
forward with a neutral explanation for striking members of the
45
defendant’s race. As peremptory strikes can be made for any reason
46
that is not racially discriminatory, the prosecution’s reasoning “does
47
not demand an explanation that is persuasive or even plausible” as
48
long as there is no racially discriminatory intent. However, “[a]
Batson challenge does not call for a mere exercise in thinking up any
rational basis . . . . [P]retextual significance does not fade because a
trial judge, or an appeals court, can imagine a reason that might not
49
have shown up as false.”
Finally, if the prosecutor fails to present a racially neutral
explanation for striking the prospective jurors, the trial court has the
50
duty of determining if the racial discrimination was intentional. The

38.
test).
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See, e.g., Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995) (explaining the Batson three-part
Id.
Id.
Id.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986).
Id.
Id. at 97.
Id.
Id. at 79–80.
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995).
Id. (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (plurality opinion)).
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 252 (2005).
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 (1986).
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trial court’s “rejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons will permit
the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional
51
discrimination.” The trial court’s ruling is generally sustained on
52
appeal unless it is clearly erroneous.
III. HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Georgia determined that Foster’s renewed
53
Batson v. Kentucky claim was without merit. The court therefore
denied Foster’s Application for Certificate of Probable Cause to
54
appeal the denial of habeas corpus.
Although Foster made several legal claims in his habeas corpus
petition to the Superior Court of Butts County, only the Batson claim
55
will be reviewed on this appeal. The habeas court applied the three56
step Batson analysis to Foster’s claim. As Foster’s case reached the
third and final step of Batson analysis, the court determined whether
or not the prosecution’s race-neutral reasons for striking black
57
potential jurors “were a pretext for purposeful discrimination.”
After examining the record, the habeas court found that “all
jurors in this case, regardless of race, were thoroughly investigated
and considered before the State exercised its peremptory
58
challenges.” The court leaned heavily on the testimony of the
59
prosecutors, and fully accepted the prosecution’s explanation that
the notes made about the prospective jurors were not intended to
60
discriminate based on race. The court also distinguished Foster’s case
61
from those he cited.

51. St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993).
52. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 (2008) (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S.
352, 369 (1991) (plurality opinion)).
53. Order Denying Application for Certificate of Probable Cause to Appeal at 1, Foster v.
Humphrey, No. S14E0771 (Ga. Nov. 3, 2014).
54. Id.
55. Order Denying Petitioner’s Request for Habeas Relief at 14, Foster v. Humphrey, No.
1989-V-2275 (Ga. Super. Dec. 4, 2014).
56. Id. at 15.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 17.
59. Id. at 16–17.
60. See id. (accepting the investigator’s explanation that his notes were meant to compile
information about each juror in order to “help pick a fair jury”).
61. Id. at 16 (describing that the court viewed the facts of Foster’s case differently than
those facts in Miller-El v. Dretke and Adkinds v. Warden, Holman CF because the race of all
potential jurors was marked).
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The Superior Court of Butts County determined that Foster failed
to present evidence proving that the prosecutor purposefully
62
discriminated in exercising its peremptory strikes. Additionally, the
court found that the State “offered evidence sufficient to rebut
63
[Foster’s] claim.” In making its decision, the court emphasized that
both the trial court and the Georgia Supreme Court denied Foster’s
64
initial Batson claims. Agreeing with the initial 1988 review of the
Georgia Supreme Court, which stated that “the prosecutor’s
explanations were related to the case to be tried, and were clear and
65
reasonably specific,” the habeas court denied Foster’s assertion of a
Batson claim. In its denial of Foster’s Application for Certificate of
Probable Cause to appeal the denial of habeas corpus, the Georgia
66
Supreme Court endorsed the reasoning of the habeas court.
IV. ARGUMENTS
A. Foster’s Arguments
Foster argues that the prosecution intentionally struck black
67
prospective jurors to achieve an all-white jury. According to Foster,
“[t]he evidence of racial motive by the prosecution in this racially
68
charged capital case is extensive and undeniable.” Thus, Foster
argues that the State’s actions are enough to meet the standard set by
69
step three of the Batson v. Kentucky analysis.
First, Foster argues that the prosecution displayed discriminatory
intent in its evaluation of the jurors, as evidenced by a “sharp focus on
70
the race of the prospective jurors.” Foster pointed to several pieces
of evidence from which to infer racial motivation. For example, the
names of the black prospective jurors were highlighted, their names
were designated with a “B,” and their race was circled on the jury
71
questionnaires. Furthermore, the prosecution only compiled a list of

62. Id. at 17.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Order Denying Application for Certificate of Probable Cause to Appeal at 1,
Foster v. Humphrey, No. S14E0771 (Ga. Nov. 3, 2014).
67. See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 16, at 26.
68. Id. at 21.
69. See id.
70. Id. at 26.
71. Id. at 26–27 (citing Joint Appendix at 253–76, Foster v. Chatman, No. 14-8349 (U.S.
July 24, 2015)).
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72

notes on black prospective jurors. Foster presents the fact that not a
single black juror was chosen to serve on the jury as the most glaring
73
evidence of intentional racial discrimination.
Second, Foster contends that the evidence discredits the reasons
for striking the black prospective jurors proffered by the prosecution.
According to Foster, the prosecution “exaggerated facts to make the
black panelists seem problematic, gave reasons that also applied to
white prospective jurors, and contradicted themselves and their own
74
notes.” For example, one of the myriad reasons given for striking
thirty-four-year-old Marilyn Garrett was her young age, but a white
75
twenty-one-year-old, however, was allowed to serve on the jury.
Furthermore, Garrett’s employment as an aide at a Head Start
76
program was another reason presented to explain her strike.
According to the prosecution, Garrett was likely sympathetic to
disadvantaged children, which was relevant as Foster had grown up
77
poor. Two white jurors, however, were selected because they were
teachers, like the murder victim, and were thus viewed as likely to
78
display sympathy towards the victim. The prosecutors tried to justify
this discrepancy by claiming that Garrett’s position as a Head Start
79
aide made her a social worker, not a teacher.
Similarly, Foster argues that black prospective juror Eddie Hood
was treated in a manner inconsistent with the treatment of white
prospective jurors. For example, the prosecution phrased questions
differently when questioning Hood than it did while questioning
80
whites. While Hood’s membership in the Church of Christ was used
to strike him, white Church of Christ members were not struck on the
81
basis of their religion. Foster also notes that the prosecution had
82
“problems with the demeanor of all four [black] prospective jurors.”

72. Id. at 27.
73. See id.
74. Id. at 28–29.
75. Id. at 32 (citations omitted).
76. Id. (citing Joint Appendix at 56, Foster v. Chatman, No. 14-8349 (U.S. July 24, 2015)).
77. See id. (citation omitted).
78. Id. at 33–34 (citation omitted).
79. See id.
80. See id. at 41 (citation omitted) (explaining that the prosecutors encouraged white
prospective jurors to demonstrate their ability to be fair and impartial, but that the prosecutors
gave no such encouragement to Hood).
81. Id. at 44–45 (citation omitted).
82. Id. at 37 (citing Joint Appendix at 51–53, 55, Foster v. Chatman, No. 14-8349 (U.S. July
24, 2015)).

DALY FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

2/20/2016 12:08 PM

CLARIFYING THE BATSON TEST FOR DISCRIMINATORY PEREMPTORY STRIKES

157

Finally, Foster asserts that the Court should not give deference to
the decision of the Georgia habeas court, as the habeas court relied
83
on the rulings of the trial court and the Georgia Supreme Court.
Foster argues that the state habeas court should not have deferred to
the holdings of the trial court and the Georgia Supreme Court
because those courts did not have the new evidence of purposeful
84
racial discrimination: the prosecution’s notes. Thus, Foster contends
that the court “failed to give meaningful consideration to ‘all relevant
85
circumstances’ as Batson requires.”
B. The State of Georgia’s Arguments
The State of Georgia argues that the habeas court did not commit
86
clear error when it rejected Foster’s Batson claim. According to the
State, Foster failed to provide the habeas court with facts sufficient to
overturn the findings of the Georgia Supreme Court and failed to
87
prove discriminatory intent. The State argues that the new
documents presented by Foster are simply work product aiming to
adequately document peremptory strikes in a manner that would beat
Foster’s inevitable Batson claim. Thus, the State contends that the new
88
evidence still fails to meet the third step of a valid Batson claim.
The State contends that the state habeas court committed no clear
error in finding that Foster’s new evidence failed to show that
prosecutors used discriminatory intent in using their peremptory
89
strikes. In fact, the State argues that none of the new evidence shows
90
any intent to discriminate. It views the new evidence as flawed for
two reasons. First, Foster’s interpretation of the prosecution’s notes
was speculative, as the two prosecutors who handled Foster’s jury trial
91
were never called to the stand and interrogated. In sworn affidavits
before the state habeas court, Foster’s trial prosecutors testified that
92
their strikes were race-neutral. For example, the State justifies the
investigations the prosecution made into the backgrounds of each
83. See id. at 50–52.
84. See id. at 50.
85. Id. at 51 (quoting Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005)).
86. See Brief of Respondent, supra note 8, at 16.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 18–19.
89. See id. at 19.
90. See id. at 20.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 23 (citing Joint Appendix at 168–71, Foster v. Chatman, No. 14-8349 (U.S. July
24, 2015)).
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potential juror, explaining that “[it] sought to obtain all the
93
information possible on all prospective jurors.” Additionally, a black
investigator defended making notes on prospective jurors who he
knew personally, and the prosecutor even argued that the State
94
actually aimed to select a black juror. Second, the State contends
that, since Foster had filed several motions designed to prohibit
discriminatory strikes prior to voir dire, the prosecution had ample
non-discriminatory reasons for marking and highlighting the race of
95
the black jurors. The prosecution claims that it kept detailed
information on each black prospective juror to defend against an
96
inevitable Batson inquiry.
The State also argues that portions of the new evidence actually
corroborate the State’s stated reasons for using its peremptory strikes
97
against the black potential jurors. Notes taken by the prosecution
during voir dire mirror the reasons given during testimony for striking
98
both Eddie Hood and Marilyn Garrett. According to the State, the
99
fact that these were “contemporaneous observations” supports the
legitimacy of the prosecution’s presented reasoning behind striking
them from the jury.
The State contends that the state habeas court committed no clear
error in relying on the trial court’s conclusion that the prosecutors’
strikes were not pretextual because it accepted the prosecution’s race100
neutral reasons for exercising their peremptory strikes. Thus, the
State argues the habeas court’s approval of the trial court’s Batson
101
analysis was proper. Furthermore, the State argues that differences
in the treatment of similarly situated white prospective jurors do not
102
amount to an indication of a pretext. The State maintains that, while
black and white prospective jurors might share some similar
characteristics, jurors are selected based on the sum of all of their
103
104
characteristics, so Foster’s new evidence proves very little. Thus,
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See id. at 24.
Id. at 26 (citing Joint Appendix, supra note 74, at 99–100).
See id. at 20–21.
See id. at 22–23.
See id. at 29.
Id. at 29–32 (citing Joint Appendix, supra note 74, at 303–10).
Id. at 30.
See id. at 32.
See id. (“This was not error, let alone clear error.”).
See id. at 33.
See id.
Id. at 57.
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the State asks the Court to give deference to the factual finding of the
habeas court, as it found no purposeful racial discrimination based
105
upon the evidence presented by Foster.
V. ANALYSIS
Foster v. Chatman hinges on whether or not the state habeas court
erred when it found that the prosecution did not purposefully
discriminate in issuing its peremptory strikes. Here, the Court
should—and likely will—hold that the habeas court should have
found that the prosecution purposefully and strategically used its
peremptory strikes on the potential black jurors to produce an allwhite jury.
Although the Supreme Court has rejected Batson challenges
106
recently, it should rule in Foster’s favor here. The use of strikes
against black prospective jurors in Foster’s case has much in common
with other successful Batson challenges, and in some ways is more
egregious here. For example, the Supreme Court dealt with a case that
107
mirrors Foster’s closely in Miller-El v. Dretke. In Miller-El, ninetyone percent of the eligible black jurors were struck by the
prosecution, a fact which the Court considered to be a “disparity
108
unlikely to have been produced by happenstance.” In Foster’s case,
109
all of the black jurors were struck. Furthermore, the prosecution in
Miller-El struck a black juror for giving a response similar to one
110
given by a white juror chosen to serve on the jury. In response,
Miller-El stated that “[i]f a prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking a
black panelist applies just as well to a white panelist allowed to serve,
111
that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination.” This
suggests that the Court would view the discrepancies between the
treatment of Marilyn Garrett, Eddie Hood, and white potential jurors

105. See id. at 57–58.
106. See Felkner v. Jackson, 562 U.S. 594, 598 (2011) (holding that the Ninth Circuit should
not have struck the California Court of Appeal’s reasonable upholding of a prosecutor’s raceneutral explanations); Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341–42 (2006) (finding that the trial court
correctly found that the prosecutor’s strike based on one juror’s demeanor did not constitute a
Batson violation).
107. 545 U.S. 231 (2005).
108. Id. at 232.
109. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 16, at 5–6.
110. Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 232–33. (“Here, a black potential juror was excused for
expressing apprehension about using the death penalty over life imprisonment. However,
several white potential jurors who voiced similar opinions were chosen for service.”).
111. Id. at 232.

DALY FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE)

160

2/20/2016 12:08 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 11

by the prosecution in Foster as evidence of discrimination. Likewise,
several courts have determined that “laundry lists” of race-neutral
explanations for peremptory strikes are themselves evidence of
112
discriminatory intent. Here, the prosecution came up with a list of
113
eight to twelve reasons for striking each qualified black potential
juror. Thus, the Court has yet another reason to rule in Foster’s favor.
Given the parallels between Foster’s case and Miller-El, it is very
unlikely that the Supreme Court will rule differently, especially since
commentators believe that Miller-El did not succificently clarify the
Batson test.
Foster provides an opportunity to fix issues with the Batson test.
Since its inception, many have been critical of Batson’s effectiveness
114
in preventing peremptory strikes. Justice Thurgood Marshall was
115
cynical about Batson’s potential effectiveness, and Justice Breyer
116
has expressed similar skepticism. As Justice Marshall predicted,
Batson has not become an effective weapon against discriminatory
peremptory strikes. Typically, courts give extreme deference to the
race-neutral explanations prosecutors give for exercising their strikes.
117
It is rare for a trial court to grant a defendant’s Batson claim, and
118
appellate courts are inconsistent in their handling of Batson claims.
119
In Southern jurisdictions, Batson claims almost always fail. Notably,
120
the Tennessee Supreme Court has never granted a Batson claim.
Widespread denial of Batson claims is not unique to the South. In a
112. See, e.g., Sheets v. State, 535 S.E.2d 312, 315 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding that a
“‘laundry list’ of reasons” was evidence of using a pretextual excuse to hide discriminatory
purpose behind peremptory strike).
113. Brief of Petitioner, supra note 16, at 22 (citing Joint Appendix, supra note 74, at 41–
57).
114. See Mimi Samuel, Focus on Batson: Let the Cameras Roll, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 95, 104
(2008); see also Baldus, et al., supra note 4, at 10 (“The United States Supreme Court decisions
banning these practices appear to have had only a marginal impact.”); Grosso & O’Brien, supra
note 4, at 1533 (“Among those who laud its mission, it seems that the only people not
disappointed in Batson are those who never expected it to work in the first place.”).
115. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102–03 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (“The
decision today will not end the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the juryselection process. That goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges
entirely.”).
116. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 267 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The complexity
of this process reflects the difficulty of finding a legal test that will objectively measure the
inherently subjective reasons that underlie use of a peremptory challenge . . . . Batson embodies
defects intrinsic to the task.”).
117. See, e.g., Samuel, supra note 114, at 95–96.
118. Equal Justice Initiative, supra note 6, at 19.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 20.
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study of twenty-four capital cases asserting claims in Pennsylvania,
not a single claim for Batson relief was granted by state appellate
121
courts. One commentator theorizes that frustration with this state of
affairs motivated the Supreme Court to grant certiorari from the
122
Georgia Supreme Court’s summary denial of appeal.
123
As blacks still remain underrepresented on Southern juries and
124
instances of improper peremptory strikes occur frequently, it would
not make sense for the Court to make it harder for defendants to
successfully assert claims of racial discrimination in the jury selection
process. The use of discriminatory peremptory strikes erodes trust in
the judicial system and deprives both jurors and defendants of their
constitutional rights. As Justice Blackmun wrote in J.E.B. v. Alabama
125
ex rel. T.B., “[t]he community is harmed by the State’s participation
in the perpetuation of invidious group stereotypes and the inevitable
loss of confidence in our judicial system that state-sanctioned
126
discrimination in the courtroom engenders.”
The Court should raise the threshold prosecutors must meet to
comply with Batson. Currently, the “race-neutral” bar is easily met by
coming up with some pretextual excuse. While Justice Breyer and
some scholars have promulgated the idea of getting rid of peremptory
127
strikes entirely, this is unlikely to happen, as peremptory strikes are
still widely considered to be a valuable prosecutorial tool. Instead, the
Supreme Court should issue a more refined, concrete way of handling
a Batson analysis in its Foster opinion.
CONCLUSION
In Foster v. Chatman, the Court should rule that the prosecution
acted with discriminatory intent when it used peremptory strikes
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against all of the qualified black potential jurors. As the facts of
Foster’s case closely mirror that of prior instances where the Court
found discrimination, the Court will likely rule in favor of Foster. The
Court’s ruling should clarify the ambiguity that has surrounded
Batson since its inception, finally ending the strong deference trial
and appellate courts give to race-neutral reasons offered by
prosecutors for their use of peremptory strikes.

